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INTRODUCTION
Questions of the existence of an employment relationship are not
easily resolved by only turning to federal labor and employment
statutes. Federal employment laws provide definitions for “employer”
and “employee,” but the definitions are not always helpful and often
do not provide enough guidance when the employment relationship is
in dispute. It is crucial that labor and employment laws clearly define
who is protected and who is not. The question of who is considered an
employee and who is considered an employer is equally important to
both parties. Employees need to know whether they are protected
under the law, and employers need to know whether they are subject
to liability.1 Vague definitions in the statutes and application of ever J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, B.S. in Psychology, minor
in Political Science, May 2017.
1 Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An
Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland between an
Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 609 (2012).
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changing tests, with the goal of defining an employment relationship,
are evidence of inconsistency in the law.
The Seventh Circuit recently explored this topic in Harris v. Allen
County Board of Commissioners.2 The plaintiff, Harris, was employed
by the Allen County Superior Court as a Youth Care Specialist but
was stationed at the Allen County Juvenile Center. 3 The plaintiff
signed the Allen Superior Court’s employee handbook, acknowledging
the Superior Court as his employer. However, other documents that
the plaintiff received during the term of his employment, such as his
medical records authorization and performance evaluations, bore the
seal of the Allen County Board of Commissioners, or listed the board
as the plaintiff’s employer. 4 The plaintiff was injured while at the
Juvenile Center, collected workers’ compensation benefits and later
tried to return to work, but was denied his position because of physical
restrictions caused by his injury. 5 The plaintiff filed a discrimination
suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against both the
Allen County Superior Court and the Allen County Board of
Commissioners.6 The question at issue was whether the Board of
Commissioners was an indirect employer of the plaintiff and the court
determined it was not based on an analysis of “sufficient control.”7
Part I of this note explores current labor and employment statutes
and the statutory language courts turn to when beginning their analysis
as to whether an employment relationship exists between an individual
and an employer. Part II discuss the various tests used to establish the
employment relationship and how the Seventh Circuit’s test has
evolved over the years. Part III provides an overview of the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion in Harris v. Allen County Board of Commissioners.
Part IV then discusses whether the Seventh Circuit correctly decided
the case. Part V provides a broad discussion about the concerns with
2

890 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 681.
4 Id. at 681-82.
5 Id. at 682.
6 Id. at 683.
7 Id.
3
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inconsistency in the courts and how mislabeling employees as
independent contractors has detrimental effects on both employers and
employees. Finally, the note concludes with a suggestion as to how the
courts may begin to address the blurred lines between employees and
independent contractors.
A.

BACKGROUND

Examples of Statutory Definitions

To begin the discussion about employment status, one would
think it would be most helpful to turn to the actual language of the
statute under which the employer or employee is seeking relief.
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), an
“employee” is defined as “an individual employed by an employer.” 8
An “employer” is defined as “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce that has 15 or more employees for each working
day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year.”9 Similar anti-discrimination laws define the terms
almost identically. 10
8 42

U.S.C.A. § 12111(4).
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A).
10 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) defines “employee” as
“an individual employed by any employer except that the term ‘employee’ shall not
include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of
any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be
on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an
immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers
of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include
employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental
agency, or political subdivision. The term “employee” includes any individual who
is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign
country.” 29 USCS § 630(f). “Employer” under the ADEA “means a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year: Provided, That prior to June 30, 1968, employers having fewer than
fifty employees shall not be considered employers. The term also means (1) any
agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any
agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any
9
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The Supreme Court previously “recognized that it is appropriate
for a court construing one employment statute . . . to look to other
employment law statutes . . . for guidance.”11 Consider the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
below.
The FLSA defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an
employer”12 and “employer” as

interstate agency, but such term does not include the United States, or a corporation
wholly owned by the Government of the United States.” 29 USCS § 630(b). Title
VII defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer, except that the
term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or
political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person
chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the
policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding
sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State
government, governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to
employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen
of the United States.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f). “Employer” is “a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the United
States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an
Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by
statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of Title
5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26, except that during
the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five
employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.” 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e(b).
11 Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An
Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland between an
Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 611 (2012). See,
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723 (1947) (In an FLSA case, it
was appropriate to turn to the NLRA for guidance because these acts are both
considered to be part of “social legislation.”).
12 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)(1). Exceptions outlined in (2)-(4).
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any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee and includes a public
agency but does not include any labor organization (other
than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.” 13
The NLRA defines “employee” as
Any person any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States
or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision
thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other
than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.14
“Employer” is defined as
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any
wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or
any person subject to the Railway Labor Act as amended
from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when
acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of
officer or agent of such labor organization.” 15
While some statutes are more detailed than others, it remains
clear that the language is quite circular- leaving the courts to have
to develop their own tests to establish whether an employment
relationship exists.
13
14

29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d).
29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3).
15 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2).
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The Standards Used to Establish an Employment
Relationship are Plentiful (to say the least)

The Supreme Court has said that the common law agency test is
the appropriate standard to apply when the statute does not provide a
clear-cut definition.16 Under agency law, the employer (master) is a
“principal who employs an agent . . . to perform service in his affairs
and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the
other in the performance of that service.” 17 The employee (servant) is
“an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled
or is subject to the control by the master.” 18 This begins the discussion
of the numerous standards created by the courts to determine
employment status.
The Court in Darden adopted this common-law test to define
“employee” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).19 The Court considered
the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by
which the product is accomplished . . . the skill required; the
source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s
discretion over when and how long the work; the method of
payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the
16

Emily Bodtke, When Volunteers Become Employees: Using a
Threshold-Remuneration Test Informed by the Fair Labor Standards Act to
Distinguish Employees from Volunteers, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1113 (2015) (citing
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992)).
17 Restatement of Agency (Second) 220(1) (1958).
18 Restatement of Agency (Second) 220(2) (1958).
19 Darden, 503 U.S. at 323.
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provision of the employee benefits; and the tax treatment of
the hired party.20
Additionally, the Court noted that this common-law test calls for
“all of the incidents of the relationship [to] be assessed and weighed
with no one factor being decisive.” 21
In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court again was asked to
determine whether an individual was an employee under the ADA. 22
The individuals in that case were four physician-shareholders who
owned the corporation, 23 and they constituted the board of directors
for the corporation.24 The Court, again looking at the relationship
through an agency lens, determined that the element of control was
“the principal guidepost that should be followed in this case.” 25 The
case turned on whether the shareholder-directors worked
independently or whether they were under the control of the
clinic.26This analysis was also guided by a test created by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that used 6-factors to
answer the Court’s very question. 27 The factors consider
(1)whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or
set the rules and regulations of the individual’s work; (2)
whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises
the individual’s work; (3) whether the individual reports to
20

(1989)).

Id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752

21

Id. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258
(1968)). (“Since the common-law test contains ‘no shorthand formula or magic
phrase that be applied to find the answer . . . .’”)
22 Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 441-42
(2003).
23 A medical clinic.
24 Id. at 442.
25 Id. at 448.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 449 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Compliance
Manual §§ 605:0008-605:00010 (2000)).
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someone higher in the organization; (4) whether and, if so, to
what extent the individual is able to influence the
organization; (5) whether the parties intended that the
individual be an employee, as expressed in written
agreements or contracts; and (6) whether the individual
shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the
organization.28
Interestingly, the Court returned to its own language from Darden
when it said that there is no “shorthand formula or magic phrase” by
which an answer can be found in every case. 29 This language seems to
suggest that no one factor is determinative and all the circumstances
surrounding each case should be considered.
States, such as California, have also developed their own
standards when dealing with questions of employment status. The
California Supreme Court in Dynamex created a new test for
determining whether an individual is an employee or and independent
contractor.30 After a lengthy discussion about previous California
cases that dealt with this same question, the California Supreme Court
concluded that it would apply a 3-factor test, also known as the
“ABC” test.31 This test asks employers, when classifying individuals
as independent contractors, to establish that
(A) the worker is free from the control and direction of the
hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work,
both under the contract for the performance of the work and
in fact; and (B) that the worker performs work that is outside
the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that
EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009.
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450 n.10.
30 Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018).
This case addressed wage-hour issues, in comparison to other cases cited in this note
that primarily fall under labor and employment statutes, but it is helpful to see how
the standards in various courts can be so different.
31 Id. at 955. Under this standard, workers are automatically considered
employees unless the employer can satisfy the test.
28
29
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the worker is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature
as the work performed. 32
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also created its own standard
for employers to use when determining whether an individual is an
employee or an independent contractor for tax purposes. 33 One scholar
suggested a rise in the use of independent contractors by businesses in
order to “cut costs while maintaining a high level of operational
efficiency.”34 This inevitably leads to blurred lines and the IRS
developed a 20-factor test35 by looking at “past cases and rulings
bearing on the determination of whether a business’s purported
independent contractors were actually employees.” 36
The Seventh Circuit, like many other circuits, applies a multifactor test to address the question of employment status. In Knight v.
United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, the Northern
District of Indiana addressed the “economic realities” test as one that
most courts use to “determin[e] whether a Title VII claimant is an
employee or an independent contractor.” 37 The district court turned to
a D.C. Circuit case38, among others,39 which looked to the “economic
realities” of the work relationship between the employee and the
32

Id. at 957.
Rev. Rul. 87-41 (IRS RRU), 1987-1 C.B. 296, 1987 WL 419174
34 Alexandre Zucco, Independent Contractors and the Internal Revenue
Service’s “Twenty Factor” Test: Perspective on the Problems of Today and the
Solutions for Tomorrow, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 599 (2011).
35 Rev. Rul. 87-41 (IRS RRU), 1987-1 C.B. 296, 1987 WL 419174
36 Alexandre Zucco, Independent Contractors and the Internal Revenue
Service’s “Twenty Factor” Test: Perspective on the Problems of Today and the
Solutions for Tomorrow, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 601 (2011).
37 742 F. Supp. 518, 521 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (citing Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613
F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
38 Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831.
39 See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987); Mares v. Marsh,
777 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1985); Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979 (4th
Cir.1983); Cobb v. Sun Papers, 673 F.2d 337 (11th Cir.).
33
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employer.40 The D.C. Circuit considered the general principles of the
law of “agency” and identified eleven factors which were pertinent in
deciding whether an employment relationship existed between the
parties.41 The factors included:
(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the
work usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is
done by a specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required
in the particular occupation; (3) whether the “employer” or
the individual in question furnishes the equipment used and
the place of work; (4) the length of time during which the
individual has worked; (5) the method of payment, whether
by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which the work
relationship is terminated; I. e., by one or both parties, with or
without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is
afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the
business of the “employer”; (9) whether the worker
accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the “employer”
pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the
parties.42
The district court in Knight, without much of an explanation,
consolidated the D.C. Circuit’s eleven-factor test into five factors.43
This test became known as the Knight five-factor test. Its factors
included:
(1) the extent of the employer's control and supervision over
the worker, including directions on scheduling and
performance of work; (2) the kind of occupation and nature
of skill required, including whether skills are obtained in the
workplace; (3) responsibility for the costs of operation, such
40

Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831.
Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831-32.
42 Id. at 832.
43 742 F. Supp. at 521.
41
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as equipment, supplies, fees, licenses, workplace, and
maintenance of operations; (4) method and form of payment
and benefits; and (5) length of job commitment and/or
expectations.44
The plaintiff appealed the case to the Seventh Circuit, which
validated the use of the five-factor test. 45 Today, the Seventh Circuit
still applies the five-factor test when trying to determine whether an
employment relationship exists. 46
HOW THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT MOST RECENTLY APPLIED THE KNIGHT FIVEFACTOR TEST

In Harris v. Allen County Board of Commissioners, the plaintiff,
Harris, was employed by the Allen County Superior Court (Superior
Court) to work in a juvenile center as a Youth Care Specialist.47 Under
Indiana law, the Superior Court has the ability to establish juvenile
detention and shelter care facilities, and the Superior Court decides
who it will employ as staff and how to budget. 48 Under this statutory
scheme, Allen County is responsible for paying the expenses of the
facility.49
In 2003, the plaintiff injured his back after being kicked by an
inmate at the juvenile center. 50 He received medical treatment,
disability benefits, and permanent partial impairment benefits under
this under Allen County’s workers compensation insurance.51 The
plaintiff was contacted by an Allen County employee who sent him
44Id.
45

1991).

Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377, 378 (7th Cir.

46 See

Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 702 (7th Cir. 2015).
F.3d at 682.
48 Id. at 681.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 682.
51 Id.
47 890
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forms regarding his workers’ compensation benefits. 52 The forms
listed “Allen County Government” as his employer. 53 The plaintiff
informed the county employee that his doctor determined the plaintiff
had reached “maximum medical improvement” and was given work
restrictions.54 The county employee told the plaintiff that he would not
be able to return to his position at the Juvenile Center due to his work
restrictions. However, she began helping him find another job within
Allen County.55 The county employee offered the plaintiff a job as a
part-time judicial assistant; however, the plaintiff rejected the offer
because the position was without benefits.56
The plaintiff was granted an independent medical exam by the
Indiana Workers’ Compensation Board. The independent doctor
concluded that the plaintiff had reached maximum medical
improvement.57 It was after this second exam that the county
employee reached out to the plaintiff to inform him that his benefits
were terminated and he would not be able to return to work at the
Juvenile Center because his work restrictions “prevented him from
‘perform[ing] the essential functions’ of his position at the Juvenile
Center, ‘with or without a reasonable accommodation.’” 58 The county
employee claimed to be the ADA Coordinator and offered to help the
plaintiff find another position within Allen County government.59 The
county employee also offered to contact the hiring officials of job
vacancies to assist the plaintiff in getting preference for positions for
which he qualified. 60 The county employee later informed the plaintiff
that he did not qualify for the positions he applied for.61 Because the
52

Id.
Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 682-83.
53
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county employee could not identify a position that would
accommodate the plaintiff’s work restrictions, the county employee
informed the plaintiff that he was considered no longer employed. 62
The plaintiff brought suit against the Allen County Superior Court
and the Allen County Board of Commissioners (the Board) for
discrimination under the ADA. 63 The district court found that the
Board was not the plaintiff’s employer and therefore did not violate
the ADA.64 The district court analogized the case to another Indiana
case where probation officers were found to be employees of the court
due to the statutory scheme in place. 65 In O’Reilly, the county was not
considered the probation officers’ employer because “the main indicia
of employment, the right to control, [wa]s prescribed by statute solely
to the court.”66 Based on this analysis, the Board in Harris was granted
summary judgment. 67
The plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision, and the
Seventh Circuit reviewed the decision de novo. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision. 68 The plaintiff argued: (1) the
county paid his wages and benefits; (2) several documents identified
the Board as his employer; and (3) the county employee dealt with his
disability accommodations and his termination. 69 The court noted that
a five-factor test is typically used to determine whether a party is an
indirect employer, but the court notes that the “factors are simply a
detailed application of the economic and control considerations
present in the ‘economic realities’ test.” 70 The most important question
62

Id. at 683.

63 Id.
64 Id.
65

Harris v. Allen Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57369 at 19
(citing O'Reilly v. Montgomery County, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4585 at *5).
66 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57369 at 19 (quoting O'Reilly, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4585 at *3).
67 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57369 at 19-20.
68 Harris, 890 F.3d at 685.
69 Id. at 684.
70 Id. at 683 (citing Love, 779 F.3d at 702; Knight, 950 F.2d 377).
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was whether the supposed employer exercised sufficient control over
the plaintiff.71 The court turned to two “key control powers:” hiring
and firing.72 Under Indiana law, the Board did not control the
plaintiff’s “hiring, firing, day-to-day duties, and salary . . . .”73 All of
those aspects of the plaintiff’s employment rested with the Allen
Superior Court, not the Board.74
To the plaintiff’s first argument, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that the Board was statutorily required to pay the Juvenile Center’s
expenses, and, therefore, even though the Board was not required to
pay his workers’ compensation benefits, the Board paying those
benefits to the plaintiff was not enough to show that the Board
controlled the plaintiff’s employment. 75 To the plaintiff’s second
argument, the court concluded that the documents bearing the Board’s
seal or identifying the Board as the plaintiff’s employer were not
sufficient to show control of employment. 76 The plaintiff offered
evidence that the Board conducted performance evaluations, but he
was unable to show that the Board was responsible for his discipline
while employed at the Juvenile Center. 77 The Seventh Circuit noted
that the plaintiff’s final argument, that the county employee’s
involvement exceeded what was statutorily required, was his strongest
point because the employee was the one to notify the plaintiff that he
would not be able to return to his former position, she offered him an
alternative position, she assisted him in finding other employment, and
she was the one who informed him he was terminated.78 However, the
plaintiff was unable to show that it was the county employee or the
71

705).

Harris, 890 F.3d at 683. (citing Knight, 950 F.2d at 378; Love, 779 F.3d at

72 Harris,890

F.3d at 684. (quoting EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 169 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
73 Harris, 890 F.3d at 685.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 685.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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Board that made the decision to terminate the plaintiff. 79 The county
employee indicated to the plaintiff in a letter that she was not in the
position to hire him, and could only contact the hiring officials on his
behalf.80 The Seventh Circuit concluded:
It would be unreasonable to infer that [the county employee]
or the Board had the ability to control these aspects of [the
plaintiff’s] employment, given that Indiana statutory scheme
explicitly vests control over [the plaintiff’s] employment in
the Allen Superior Court and that there is no evidence that
would allow a trier of fact to find the reality was otherwise. 81
WAS THE COURT CORRECT IN ITS DECISION?
It is evident that the Seventh Circuit has evolved its determination
of employment status and the associated tests over the last few
decades. The court began by looking at various circuits to see how
they were addressing the question of establishing employment
relationships.82 It discussed the “economic realities” test used by the
D.C. Circuit in Spirides but agreed with the district court that the
inquiry was limited to five factors in Knight.83
While the Seventh Circuit cited the five-factor test in Harris, it
did not go through all the factors to conclude that the Allen County
Board of Commissioners was not the plaintiff’s employer. Yet, in
Spirides, the Seventh Circuit indicated that “consideration of all of the
circumstances surrounding the work relationship is essential, and no
one factor is determinative.”84 Still, the court stated that the
79 Id.
80

(Emphasis added).

Id.
Id.
82 See Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831; Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d
1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986).
83 950 F.2d at 378-79.
84 613 F.2d 826 at 831 (citing Local 777 v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 866 (D.C.
Cir. 1978)).
81
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employer’s right of control was the most important factor to review. 85
The Seventh Circuit cases that used Spirides place the same emphasis
on the right of control,86 which may explain why the Seventh Circuit
in Harris only looked at the factor of control. 87 But was the Seventh
Circuit trying to establish a single-factor test for determining whether
an employment relationship exists between individuals and
employers?
Regardless of whether the court was attempting to create a new
test, the Seventh Circuit should have let this case go to a jury. As
previously mentioned, the Seventh Circuit cited its own precedent
when discussing what factors are necessary in assessing whether an
employer has the right to control and direct an individual’s work. 88
The key elements are hiring and firing. 89 In the present case, however,
there was a clear dispute as to who fired the plaintiff. 90 The plaintiff
stated that the county employee made the decision when she initiated
the conversations regarding his benefits, but he was not able to provide
proof that she was the one who made the decision. 91 In a footnote, the
Seventh Circuit briefly mentions that the plaintiff also provided a
statement that he spoke to a Superior Court employee who had no
knowledge of his firing and who told the plaintiff that “‘downtown . . .
handle[d]that.’”92 The court dismissed the statement because it was
inadmissible,93 but if the factor of control was so important, would it
not have made a difference if Allen County made the decision to fire
the plaintiff? This information, at the very least, created a genuine
85

Id. at 831.
See Knight, 950 F.2d 377; Love,779 F.3d 697.
87 Harris, 890 F.3d at 683.
88 Id. at 684.
89 Id. (quoting EEOC, 69 F.3d 169).
90 The Board insisted that it did not make the decision to terminate the
plaintiff, but the Superior Court also does not clearly state it made that decision.
Harris,890 F.3d at 684 n.1.
91 Harris, 890 F.3d at 685.
92 Id. at 686 n.2.
93 Harris, 890 F.3d at 686. Neither the district court nor the Seventh Circuit
indicate why the statement was inadmissible.
86
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dispute of material fact, which would bar granting summary
judgment.94 Given the emphasis on the factor of control--in particular,
the aspects of hiring and firing the employee—this fact could have led
the jury to reach a different conclusion.
ADDRESSING THE INCONSISTENCY IN A BROADER CONTEXT
The concerns with inconsistency in the standards that help
establish employment status can be better understood in the context of
employees versus independent contractors. There are several industries
in which workers’ classification falls somewhere between an
employee and an independent contractor. 95 Some of these industries
include transportation, construction, hospitality, janitorial, personal
care, and home health care. 96 According to the IRS, independent
contractors generally have the “right to control or direct the result of
the work[, but] not what will be done and how it will be done.” 97
Additionally, an independent contractor is considered to be “selfemployed” for tax purposes. 98
The implications for classifying an individual as an employee or
an independent contractor are quite substantial. For example,
employers are not “bound to provide workplace protections and
94

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
Brishen Rogers, Redefining Employment for the Modern Economy, 10
Advance 3 (2016), 3.
96 Brishen Rogers, Redefining Employment for the Modern Economy, 10
Advance 3 (2016), 3. (citing Sarah Leberstein & Catherine Ruckelshaus,
Independent Contractor vs. Employee: Why independent contractor misclassification
matters and what we can do to stop it, 1 (Nat'l Emp. L. Project ed., May 2016),
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Policy-Brief-Independent-Contractor-vsEmployee.pdf.)).
97Independent Contractor Defined, Internal Revenue Service,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independentcontractor-defined (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
98 Independent Contractor Defined, Internal Revenue Service,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independentcontractor-defined (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
95
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benefits” to independent contractors, only their employees. 99 An
example of this is Uber classifying its drivers as independent
contractors and not employees. This allows Uber to avoid giving
drivers health insurance. 100
When employers classify their workers as independent
contractors, they also do not have to withhold or pay taxes on the
payments made to the independent contractors. 101 Doing this “[robs]
unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation funds of billions
of much-needed dollars, reducing federal, state and local tax
withholding and revenues, while saving as much as 30% of payroll
and related taxes otherwise paid for ‘employees.’” 102
One can see how straddling the lines between these classifications
can leave an employee extremely vulnerable and without other
protections discussed in this note. In the example of Uber drivers, a
recent class action brought against the company by the drivers asks
that the drivers be recognized as employees under the California Labor
Code, and not independent contractors. 103 Specifically cited in that
case is the drivers’ wanting Uber to pay the full amount of the tips
they receive as prescribed by the California’s labor code. 104 In cases
99

Sarah Leberstein & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Independent Contractor vs.
Employee: Why independent contractor misclassification matters and what we can
do to stop it, 2 (Nat'l Emp. L. Project ed., May 2016), https://www.nelp.org/wpcontent/uploads/Policy-Brief-Independent-Contractor-vs-Employee.pdf.
100 Stephen Gandel, Uber-nomics: Here's what it would cost Uber to pay its
drivers as employees, FORTUNE MAG. (Sept. 17, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/09/17/ubernomics.
101Independent Contractor: Self-Employed or Employee, Internal Revenue
Service, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-selfemployed/independent-contractor-self-employed-or-employee (Last visited Dec. 3,
2018).
102 Sarah Leberstein, “Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes Huge
Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, 1 (National Employment Law
Project, July 2015), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/IndependentContractor-Costs.pdf.
103 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1134 (N.D. Cal.
2015).
104 Id.; Cal. Lab. Code § 351.
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such as these, however, there are other consequences of being labeled
as independent contractors. Because the workers are not employees,
they are consequently not protected under anti-discrimination laws,
such as the ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII. The drivers also do not
have the opportunity to organize a union and have representation that
can negotiate favorable employment terms for the drivers- at least not
under the NLRA. It is definitely possible that some form of
organization may be created for these drivers to participate in
bargaining with the companies, but the drivers and the union would
not be afforded the same protections under the NLRA and disputes
would not be addressed by an agency like the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB).105
Moreover, it is important to note that data has shown that 10-30
percent or more of employers misclassify their employees as
independent contractors. 106 Uncertainty in employment status likely
leads to litigation, and if it is up to courts to decide whether
individuals should be classified as employees or independent
contractors, the individuals are at the mercy of the court (and the many
conflicting tests) where they have raised their claim.
A SOLUTION?
It is concerning that courts do not have a concrete standard that
can applied uniformly to establish an employment relationship
between an employee and an employer. While it is clear many of the
cases would depend on the specific circumstances of the case and,
therefore, it is difficult to create a multi-factor test that would apply to
each set of facts, there should be some sort of guide that can be used
by the courts. In the context of employees versus independent
contractors, California’s ABC test seems to make the most sense.
105

Brishen Rogers, Redefining Employment for the Modern Economy, 10
Advance 3 (2016), 7.
106 Sarah Leberstein & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Independent Contractor vs.
Employee: Why independent contractor misclassification matters and what we can
do to stop it, 2 (Nat'l Emp. L. Project ed., May 2016), https://www.nelp.org/wpcontent/uploads/Policy-Brief-Independent-Contractor-vs-Employee.pdf.
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Given the very real concerns about misclassifying individuals as
independent contractors rather an employees 107 (due to ignorance or
self-serving intentions), classifying individuals as employees unless
the employer can satisfy a certain standard 108 seems to be the best way
to protect both employees and employers like. This author is not
prepared to say what kind of factors should go into this standard, as
the discussion in this note suggests that all the circumstances
surrounding the potential employment relationship are essential and
should be considered. 109 However, in light of the numerous tests to
establish an employment relationship between an individual and an
employer and the lack of guidance in the labor and employment
statutes, it seems to be a step in the right direction.

107

See supra part IV.
See case cited supra note 30.
109 See case cited supra note 29 and 85.
108
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